

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.262

5 May 1966

ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 May 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

(India)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS

Mr. C.H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. V. CEBIS

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. O.O. ADESOLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. W. WACHTMEISTER
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. T. WULFF

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSECHIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Sir Harold BEELEY
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON
Mr. M.J.F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. S. DePALMA
Mr. D.S. MACDONALD
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the two hundred and sixty-second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before I call on the first speaker, I should like to mention that we have in the distinguished visitors' gallery today the Minister for Law of India, Mr. G.S. Pathak, and Senator Joseph Clark of the United States.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): Before I begin my statement, I should like to join the Chairman in welcoming here today the Minister for Law of India, whom I am delighted to see with us this morning, and Senator Clark of the United States, to whom I have already been able to offer a personal welcome.

In disarmament negotiations, as in most other areas of international affairs, it is best, if one has nothing new to say, to say as little as possible. For this reason the United Kingdom delegation has intervened only rarely in the debate that has gone on in this Committee since the present session began on 27 January. Our aim has been to get agreement on what I still believe to be the most urgent of all our problems -- how to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. We were all taken to task by you, Mr. Chairman, speaking as the head of the Indian delegation on Tuesday, 3 May, for neglecting the subject of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/PV.261, p.16). I must say at once that comprehensive and universal disarmament is still the aim -- the clear and unequivocal aim -- of Her Majesty's Government. But it would be idle to pretend that agreement of that sort is within our immediate grasp, and we must not let the best be the enemy of the good. As I have said many times before -- and it is worth saying once again -- if we cannot stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and stop it soon, we may find all other progress on disarmament blocked, perhaps for ever.

I have not had much that is new to say on the subject of non-proliferation since the United States delegation submitted its draft treaty in August 1965 (ENDC/152). Today I should like, very briefly, to take stock of where we stand on this matter of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and to look forward to what we might reasonably expect in the summer session.

We now have before us two draft treaties, one of which has been amended in an effort to close the gap between them. We have heard a number of speeches analysing the wording of certain of the articles of these two draft treaties. The Italian delegation has recently suggested that an effort should be made to find a formula

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for an agreed preamble as a first step (ENDC/PV.252, p.14). The Canadian delegation has contributed a most useful detailed comparison of article II in the two drafts (ENDC/PV.254, pp.9 et seq.)

But this Committee has made little progress up to now towards the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. One of the reasons, I believe, is that in the course of our discussions it has become clear beyond a doubt that so far as the Soviet Union is concerned it regards a non-proliferation treaty as a measure directed almost exclusively against one country, the Federal Republic of Germany. In spite of repeated assurances by German statesmen, in spite of the clear German undertaking not to manufacture nuclear weapons -- an undertaking recently repeated without reservations by the Government of the Federal Republic --, and in spite of the demonstrable fact that Western Germany has taken and is taking no action that could possibly justify its constant vilification by the Soviet Union and its allies or provoke the repeated and unjustifiable accusations of militarism and revanchism -- in spite of all this, the Soviet Union seems ready to accept the dangers that nuclear weapons might really spread outside Europe and throughout the world whilst it conducts this single-minded, obsessive and vengeful campaign against one of the Western allies. It is this myopic and doctrinaire refusal to see where the real dangers lie that makes our path such a difficult one to tread.

We should not be deterred, however, by what may seem to be for the moment formidable obstacles. If we have failed to make progress by a direct confrontation of the main points at issue between East and West -- much as we deplore this situation --, it does not mean that we must resign ourselves to doing nothing. We must explore every possible way of improving the chances of eventually getting agreement. Perhaps, therefore, it would be useful at this juncture to turn aside and consider the desire of the non-aligned delegations that other collateral measures should be associated with a non-proliferation treaty. My Government is more than ready to consider and discuss all the proposals that have been made in this context, although, as the Committee knows, we do not believe that progress would be made any easier by complicating the non-proliferation treaty itself.

I think most of us accept that our approach to non-proliferation should take account of what my Ethiopian colleague has called a "commitment to reduction" (ENDC/PV.242, p.18) on the part of the nuclear Powers. This thought is reflected of

course both in the non-aligned memorandum (ENDC/158) of September 1965 and in the General Assembly resolution on non-proliferation (A/RES/2028 (XX)) adopted in 1965. This refers to "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers." (ENDC/161) That is an important aspect of non-proliferation. Unless some balance were intended here, we should indeed be exposed to the charge that we were asking nations to undertake an act of renunciation unwarranted by a valid political counterpart, as the representative of Brazil has suggested (ENDC/PV.244, p.15).

I should like, therefore, to take a few minutes this morning to examine seriously the question of which among the other collateral measures under consideration in this Committee would contribute to the achievement of a reasonable balance of obligations in the context of non-proliferation.

An important element in this problem was clearly defined by the representative of Burma on 22 March. He said:

"But we feel that it would not be asking too much of the nuclear Powers to request them, at least as a start, to show some evidence that efforts are being made to take the first essential steps to inhibit the quantitative and qualitative enhancement of their nuclear arsenals.

"An undertaking on the part of the non-nuclear weapon Powers not to manufacture nuclear weapons would in effect mean forgoing the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and such production is the first essential step for the manufacture of these weapons and constitutes an important dividing line between restraint from and pursuit of the nuclear path. An undertaking on the part of the major nuclear Powers to halt the production of fissionable materials of weapons grade would mean the cutting-off of additional supplies." (ENDC/PV.250, p.28)

In my earlier speech, also on 22 March (ibid., p.21), I took occasion to welcome the United States proposals (ENDC/120, 165) for a freeze on delivery vehicles and a cut-off in the production of fissile material. The United Kingdom is impressed by the contribution towards actual disarmament which both those proposals would involve. They constitute in fact a logical first step in the limitation and reduction of existing nuclear arsenals. And they would provide a substantial counterpart to an act of renunciation by the non-nuclear weapon Powers. The United Kingdom delegation

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has awaited with great interest, therefore, the response of the non-aligned delegations and the delegations from Eastern Europe to these proposals. Already, at the very first meeting of our present session, on 27 January, Ambassador Khallaf of the United Arab Republic in a particularly lucid and constructive speech had commented as follows:

"With regard to collateral measures in general, we still have to consider a certain number of important measures proposed by the United States of America and the Soviet Union. We have had occasion to express our views on this subject, but unfortunately no agreement has yet been reached on it. We have noted with interest certain adjustments which the United States delegation has proposed ... in some of the collateral measures designed to slow down the race for nuclear weapons, particularly as regards the possibility of a substantial material destruction of nuclear weapons.

"We think that perhaps this constitutes an effort by the United States delegation to take into account the Soviet Union's objection that those proposals implied the establishment of control without disarmament. We hope that the United States delegation will develop this new aspect of its proposals and that the Soviet Union will be able to inform us of its reactions to them. We believe that we should continue, with the same patience and perseverance as before, to explore all possibilities of agreement concerning the collateral measures submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union."

(ENDC/PV.235, pp.39, 40)

Since then other non-aligned delegations have spoken in favour of one or other or both of the collateral measures to which I have referred. For example, the representative of Sweden supported the cut-off (ENDC/PV.247, pp.13,14), and the representative of Nigeria urged that strenuous efforts be made towards the achievement of a freeze (ENDC/PV.235, p.32), while the representatives of Mexico (ENDC/PV.242, p.5) and the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.245, p.15) expressed support for both measures. A serious and thoroughgoing discussion of these two measures would therefore, it seems, meet the wishes of many of the non-aligned as well as the Western delegations.

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The United States delegation has given us a detailed technical exposé of both proposals in its speeches of 8 and 15 March (ENDC/PV.246, pp.33 et seq.; ENDC/PV.248, pp.7 et seq.). The cut-off has also been the subject of three working papers circulated by the United States, dealing with the verification of a cut-off (ENDC/134), the transfer of fissionable material (ENDC/172), and the inspection of shutdown plutonium reactors (ENDC/174). All this indicates to an impressive degree not only in how much detail these proposals have been worked out but how much care has been directed to making their implementation as unintrusive as possible. In our view these are two practical measures which deserve serious study. They clearly belong to the category of measures which, in the terms of the non-aligned Memorandum of September 1965 (ENDC/158), should be associated with a non-proliferation treaty.

Inevitably there arises the question where these measures should be fitted in. We have had a number of suggestions: that they should be incorporated in a non-proliferation treaty; that they should be related to the clause governing the entry into force of such a treaty; or that they should be the subject of a declaration of intent incorporated in or made simultaneously with a non-proliferation treaty. My own feeling is that we must take care not to overload the treaty itself with a superstructure of additional measures which can only hamper and delay its negotiation. What is necessary is that the sincere intent of the nuclear Powers to put such measures into effect is clear beyond doubt to the non-nuclear weapon Powers when the time comes for them to sign a non-proliferation treaty.

In the light of this statement of the United Kingdom's position the Committee will understand my disappointment with the totally negative response of the Soviet delegation to the two United States proposals. I should like to draw attention to the fact that, quite apart from the intrinsic merit of the proposals -- on which differences of opinion are to be expected of course -- none of the East European delegations seems to have appreciated their significance as a response to the justifiable desire of the non-aligned delegations for some additional balancing factor in association with a non-proliferation treaty.

I shall return in a moment to another aspect of this matter of the balance of sacrifices, but first I should like to put one other thought before the Conference. I should expect any government, in deciding whether to sign a non-proliferation

treaty, to estimate what it would gain and what it would lose if the treaty which it signed came into force. The government of a non-nuclear State might calculate that it would lose a valuable military option which might in its view be vital to its security. Therefore that government would ask, as some of the non-aligned already have, for an acceptable balance of sacrifice by the present nuclear weapon States.

But we should not forget the reverse of this coin. I believe that any responsible government of a non-nuclear weapon State must also consider the effect on its own security of a world without a non-proliferation treaty. No country could hope that it would for very long remain the only addition to the number of nuclear Powers -- supposing that it decided to take that step. Others would follow, increasing rather than diminishing the threat to the first nation's security. Would the first country then be any better off, even in merely military terms?

I would ask the non-aligned delegations to ponder on this point in case it turned out to be impossible to get agreement among the nuclear Powers to some measures of reduction. And, after all, the apparent lack of interest by the Soviet Union in the United States proposals suggests that the omens are not particularly favourable. I should like to ask the non-nuclear Powers most seriously whether, if this position were reached -- a treaty within our grasp, but the choice of collateral measures still in dispute -- it would not still be in the interest of every non-nuclear State to call a halt to the spread of nuclear weapons even if the nuclear weapon Powers themselves had not actually begun to disarm.

On another question connected with the security of the non-nuclear States the outlook is rather better. It should be possible to reach agreement on some kind of guarantee to enhance the security of the non-nuclear Powers, to protect them from nuclear attack or blackmail. All the nuclear Powers represented here have accepted that it is right to try to formulate a guarantee for this purpose, and it is for the beneficiaries of such a guarantee to consider what form they would want it to take. The formulation outlined in President Johnson's message (ENDC/165) has what seems to me to be the practical advantage that it would give a measure of protection to non-nuclear signatories of a treaty against threats from States which are unlikely to sign such a treaty immediately. The proposal of the Soviet Union in Mr. Kosygin's

message to this Conference (ENDC/167) for a non-use guarantee by nuclear Powers party to the treaty, which we recognize as evidence that the Soviet Union too has recognized the general problem and made a serious attempt to deal with it, would not cover this eventuality.

Perhaps at the right moment we should consider whether some compromise between these two approaches might not be possible. For instance, any objection the non-aligned might have to a positive guarantee -- for fear that it would force them against their will into a degree of alignment -- might disappear if it were possible to make such a guarantee multilateral instead of unilateral. Perhaps we might take this question up again after the coming recess.

I should now like to come back to the question of the balance of sacrifices -- but this time to talk about the balance of sacrifice involved for each of the two main alliances in any collateral measure. It has been said that proposals for partial disarmament fall into two classes: those which are advanced with the genuine intention of moving towards disarmament, and those which are aimed simply at securing a strategic advantage for the proposer. I suggest that many of the collateral measures put forward by representatives of the Warsaw Pact fall into the second category; they do not entail any equality of sacrifice.

Take the proposal for immediate elimination of foreign bases. Everyone here will remember the objections raised by many delegations to the draft resolution (DC/218) which the Soviet Union put forward and then withdrew at last year's session of the Disarmament Commission. Here there was an attempt to deny States the right of collective defence allowed by the Charter of the United Nations. Looking at it another way, there was a blatantly disproportionate sacrifice asked of those States threatened by a neighbour and therefore needing the prompt support of an ally; we might, for example, take the case of Malaysia.

What about equality between the major alliances? I have already pointed out in an earlier speech in this session (ENDC/PV.250, pp.16, 17) that the bare facts of geography make it necessary for the Western Alliance, whose main strength lies in the United States, 3,000 miles from the borders of the Warsaw Pact, to have United States troops stationed in Europe as long as the conditions of tension and suspicion, which we all deplore, are not changed. For United States forces to withdraw from Europe now would give a huge strategic advantage to the Warsaw Pact and, far from causing tension to relax, would intensify it. In the event of war in Western Europe -- however unlikely that might be -- given the superiority of the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact, the United States would then be able to fulfil its treaty commitments only by an almost automatic resort to strategic nuclear weapons. The world would then be in an even more precarious state than it is in now.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

Similar arguments of inequality of sacrifice can be raised over the proposals that have been made for arms control in Central Europe. Her Majesty's Government supports the concept of nuclear-free zones, and we are following with interest and goodwill the progress of the preparatory meeting for a Latin-American nuclear-free zone now being held in Mexico City. We have been attracted too by the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Africa. If these imaginative projects can be brought to success, there is to my mind no reason why we cannot contemplate a nuclear-free zone in Europe as well, given the right conditions. But the Soviet Union and its allies must realize that these conditions will have to take account of justifiable objections by the West to any proposals that involve a disproportionate and dangerous sacrifice of security.

No one, I believe, can legitimately raise this sort of objection to the proposals for collateral measures submitted by the United States, which I have already discussed in some detail. Indeed, representatives of the Warsaw Pact countries have not even argued against them on these grounds. Instead they have tried to brush them aside as irrelevant and meaningless. I do not think it is right that they should be allowed to get away with this. It is not only illogical, but it seems also to underestimate the intelligence of the members of this Conference.

How can a delegation that speaks in favour of a measure on the very fringes of disarmament -- for example, a non-aggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- denounce and then virtually ignore a proposal which entails the destruction by each side of weapons capable of destroying a hundred cities? Far from involving a greater sacrifice by the Soviet Union, the proposal for transfer of fissile material provides for a greater quantity to be destroyed by the United States than by the Soviet Union, in recognition of the fact that United States stocks are larger. If the Soviet Union believes that the quantities suggested still involve a greater sacrifice by it, why does it not say so? But I think the Soviet Union should realize that its present position is untenable. It cannot with impunity go on arrogantly dismissing measures of exactly the kind which all the delegations of countries outside the Eastern bloc regard as appropriate in association with a non-proliferation treaty.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

I should like to end with some remarks on this session so far. No one can pretend that we have made visible progress on any of the measures with which we have dealt. But I do not believe that anyone who has followed these negotiations over the years, and seen the way in which periods of apparent stagnation have preceded agreement, should be altogether disheartened. I believe that we have cleared away many of the thickets of misunderstanding around the different problems. We have identified and isolated the points of difference between the groups of members. But we must do more than this after the recess. No one can face with anything but alarm the prospect of returning to the General Assembly of the United Nations once more with nothing to show for our efforts.

I hope that when we resume in June we shall be able to renew our efforts to some effect. It is obvious that concessions will have to be made if agreement is to be reached. There is no hope of movement in any negotiation unless both sides are prepared to be flexible and move out from their positions, however long they may have been entrenched there. The revised United States draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1) is, in our view, a sign of flexibility of the sort that we need. I believe that the non-aligned delegations will continue to play an important part in finding some middle ground between the positions adopted by the two alliances. The proposals by the Swedish delegation for a form of inspection by challenge (ENDC/PV.256) and for the establishment of a co-ordinating centre for seismic detection (ENDC/PV.247, pp.16 et seq.); the suggestion by the delegation of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.224, p.9) for some kind of threshold above which we might conclude an uninspected underground test ban; the Mexican proposal (ENDC/PV.246, p.9) for inspection by an international board of scientists -- all these are examples of the sort of thing I have in mind. I do not pretend that in their present form they are perfect from our point of view. The requirements of national security and of the collective security of the Western Alliance impose obligations which we cannot disregard. But, as we have already demonstrated, this does not mean that we are not prepared to move from our present position if we see a real chance of agreement. That chance, however, will come only when other delegations around this table show signs that they are prepared to move as well.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): On behalf of my delegation, I welcome to our midst the Minister for Law of India and Senator Clark of the United States.

I should like to join other representatives in a stock-taking exercise, now that we are coming to the end of this session. Perhaps many will join me in saying that our accomplishments on the credit side are nothing to write home about. We have failed because we are afraid, and I dare say that there are genuine causes for fear.

Having made that brief general remark, I should like to speak on two of the issues with which we have been confronted. The first is the proposal for a regional approach to disarmament, with special reference to Africa; the second is the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

When the representative of the United States spoke on 19 April (ENDC/PV.257), he made many points which are of considerable interest to those of us from the continent of Africa. His central theme on that occasion was the idea of a regional approach to disarmament. As far as we know, not much has been said about the subject in this Committee since then; but we noted that, when the Soviet Foreign Minister visited Rome recently, the idea of an all-European conference on security was discussed. In presenting his proposals Ambassador Foster said at one point:

"The aim of this Committee is, of course, to consider measures which will increase the security of States and enhance international stability.

Accordingly we shall wish to keep in mind any special military situations in various parts of the world. Some smaller countries are confronted by serious threats". (ibid., p.16).

Speaking on 27 January Ambassador Foster made a similar statement, as follows:

"We in this Committee have a unique opportunity, as well as a heavy responsibility, to seek agreements which will reduce international tension and build the foundation for a stable peace. Existing tensions do not make our task easier". (ENDC/PV.235, p.21).

Indeed, existing tensions do not make our task easier.

(Mr. Liewere, Nigeria)

My delegation agrees with both statements. We believe that there is a close relationship between the arms race and injustice in some parts of the world. It is hardly worth while preaching the gospel of disarmament when some countries are only too willing to connive at or even encourage acts of injustice by the use or the threat of force. My country has always supported any move to achieve a just and lasting peace in the world. Centres of tension will have to be reduced to the minimum, and my country has taken active steps to achieve this. In the Congo we established an enviable record in improving the political climate in that country. Early this year my country took the initiative of summoning a Commonwealth Conference on Rhodesia. At the United Nations we have used our influence and votes in the interest of world peace.

What are the prospects for lessening tension in Africa and for a regional approach to disarmament? First, let us consider the situation in Rhodesia. In that country a minority-stranger element, constituting less than 7 per cent of the population, has imposed itself on the rightful owners of the country by the use of force. In the process of this act the leaders of this group have committed all the crimes known to the laws on treason, and so far they have been getting away with it.

As far as I know, no effort is being made to take appropriate action against the rebels. From what one may gather from a study of Press statements the reason for this are, first, that because the rebels in Rhodesia are armed to the teeth it would be an extremely difficult military task to deal with them; second, that because the rebels have friends and relatives in certain countries it would be politically unwise to apply any drastic measure; and third, that democracy, the rule of the will of the majority, cannot be contemplated in Rhodesia because it will mean handing over the government to Africans, and it is believed that when this happens it will not serve the economic and political interests of the rebels and their principals.

To our mind the Rhodesian issue clearly shows that it pays to be armed. Yes, it pays to be armed, but we must point out that it is a bad precedent and a bad example to others and has done considerable disservice to the cause of disarmament. Can we be assured that, if a man like Ian Smith decides to violate and actually violates any international treaty resulting from our negotiations here or elsewhere, appropriate action will be taken against him if the victims of his action are Africans? Will the same arguments not be used to enable him to escape justice?

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

Will this not affect the attitude of some of us towards disarmament negotiations? If Ian Smith had been a Pandit Nehru or a Colonel Nasser or a Jomo Kenyatta or a Joshua Nkomo or a Kenneth Kaunda or an Osita Agwuna, we can have no possible doubt as to what his fate would have been by now. It is the view of my delegation that it is difficult to preach the gospel of disarmament to a man whose next-door neighbour enjoys a bounteous harvest by the use of arms. For our efforts here to bear fruit we must carry our people along with us, and to do so we must show them that there is a sincere desire on the part of all concerned to carry out obligations resulting from our efforts. We must be in a position to prove to them that in carrying out these obligations no double standards will be applied.

In the second place, we wish to remind this Committee that many areas in Africa are still under colonial rule. All appeals made to the colonial Powers to free our people have fallen on deaf ears. This sort of situation does not help the cause of disarmament. Under-development is bad, poor education is bad, disease and ignorance are bad, but an undignified and humiliating existence, which is the essence of colonialism, is certainly unbearable.

Finally, there is the South African issue. There is no doubt that the policy of oppression and degradation of Africans in South Africa does not help the cause of world peace and consequently does not help the cause of disarmament. We are obliged to draw attention to these issues because we want to remind the Committee that while we are trying to cure a symptom we must not lose sight of the disease.

The emerging nations in Africa are not interested in building up arms beyond the level required for internal security and defence against aggression. They have more pressing problems. Those who are interested in building up arms in Africa beyond this level and for purposes of aggression and oppression are the stranger elements -- the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the South Africans and the settler Rhodesians. It is clear that the veritable experiment in illegality now going on in Rhodesia is aimed at imposing permanently on the majority of the people a minority stranger-element government. South Africa has already acquired some nuclear capability, and if it should succeed in producing nuclear weapons we have no illusions at all about how they would be used.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

The views of my delegation on the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty have been made clear both here and in New York. We believe that the conclusion of such a treaty will take us a long way towards achieving our ultimate goal, which is general and complete disarmament. On this occasion we should like to touch on two aspects of the treaty on non-proliferation.

The first concerns the nature of the treaty. About this United Nations General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) leaves no room for ambiguity, because it says:

"2(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form". (ENDC/161)

If we base our negotiations on the guide-lines provided by the United Nations, which we believe are clear enough, then we shall have no need to re-define what a non-proliferation treaty is or should be.

We have received a clear mandate, in very simple and clear language, and my delegation believes that our duty is to work towards concluding a treaty strictly in line with this mandate. It may not be profitable and, as a matter of fact, it could be dangerous for us to give a fresh definition to "proliferation". The definition of the word is implicit in United Nations resolution 2028 (XX). It does not leave room for a half-way house between proliferation and non-proliferation -- you either proliferate or you do not. It may be true that the standard set by the resolution is too high for our individual requirements, but it is also true that by voting for that resolution we assumed a moral obligation to abide by it.

There is no doubt that the existence of military alliances, each made up of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States, presents special difficulties. Indeed, any such alliance contains a built-in resistance to the ideals of a non-proliferation treaty. This, in our view, is because in a military alliance made up of nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States there is the danger of proliferation by trick. Suppose we have four States forming an alliance. States A and B are nuclear weapon States while C and D are not. Is it not possible for C and D, the non-nuclear weapon States, to persuade A and/or B to use nuclear weapons to further the interests of C and/or D, the non-nuclear weapon States? Then it will be the nuclear weapon

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

States that are using the weapons, but they will be acting as agents of the non-nuclear weapon States. There is no doubt that in such a case there is effective proliferation. No one is suggesting that, in the interests of a non-proliferation treaty, existing military alliances should be dissolved. The world is perhaps not yet ready for that.

The second question we should like to raise concerns guarantees for the nuclear "have-nots". My delegation has fathered the idea of writing into the treaty on non-proliferation an article on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States parties to the treaty (ENDC/PV.235, p.31). We are happy to note that both the United States (ENDC/165, p.2) and the Soviet Union (ENDC/167, p.3) have indicated their desire to provide a form of guarantee in one way or another. When the details of these are worked out we may have further comments to make.

The representative of Canada, speaking in the Committee on 17 February, agreed that our proposal was "entirely reasonable" (ENDC/PV.241, p.12), but speaking on the same subject on 3 March he pointed out that --

"... it would be very difficult to incorporate effective guarantees in a simple treaty on non-proliferation, a treaty resembling the United States and USSR drafts. Of course, it is possible that the nuclear Powers here represented, or one of them, could produce the text of an article setting out in general terms the principle that nuclear Powers were responsible for ensuring against nuclear attack or threats of it the safety of non-aligned nations which agreed to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Such an article could serve as a basis for separate bilateral or multilateral agreements to be made between those non-nuclear nations which felt that they needed guarantees and one or more of the nuclear Powers." (ENDC/PV.245, p.23)

We feel that the idea of a "separate bilateral" agreement involving "one or more of the nuclear Powers" is not consistent with the non-aligned status of the non-nuclear weapon States which are expected to be parties to this arrangement. What is probably more suitable is that all nuclear weapon States parties to the treaty on non-proliferation should agree to provide the guarantees and that this should be written into the treaty.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): First, I should like to join in the welcome which the Chairman and other members of the Committee have already extended to the Minister for Law of India and to Senator Clark, who, as many members of the Committee know, is a strong proponent of disarmament and has given to many of us in this Committee a great deal of encouragement to persevere in our work.

As we approach the recess the Canadian delegation would like to place before the Committee a few thoughts relating to non-proliferation and to general and complete disarmament.

On 4 April I asked precisely what the USSR delegation conceived to be the meaning of the words "ownership", "control", "use" and "disposal" (ENDC/PV.254, pp.11 et seq.). It appeared to us that a clear understanding of what the Soviet Union intended those words to mean in the Soviet text was essential to the progress of further negotiations. We note that the representative of the Soviet Union gave an explanation in his statement on 28 April of what he considered the word "control" should signify (ENDC/PV.260, pp.4 et seq.). Having studied the Soviet representative's remarks on this point, the Canadian delegation is led to ask some further questions.

Article II of the Soviet text would place parties to the treaty not possessing nuclear weapons under the obligation not to "participate in the ownership, control or use of such weapons or in testing them". (ENDC/164, p.5). We have pointed out our objection to part of the obligation that this article would seek to impose upon States not possessing nuclear weapons which are also members of an alliance including amongst its members a nuclear Power. I do not intend to go into this point again, but would refer delegations to my remarks of 4 April (ENDC/PV.254, pp.13,14). Is it reasonable to seek to exclude members of an alliance from participation in the control of nuclear weapons in view of the interpretation which the USSR representative gave of the word "control" in his statement on 28 April? From a study of the language in document ENDC/PV.260, we understand that the Soviet delegation believes that control over nuclear weapons should mean control over "the production, ownership, handling and disposal of ... atomic weapons." (ENDC/PV.260, p.5).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

As I pointed out on 4 April, there is no real divergence between the United States and Soviet Union texts restricting production of nuclear weapons by nations not possessing them (ENDC/PV.254, p.10). We then come (ibid. p.13) to a difficulty over what is meant by "possessing" nuclear weapons, especially in the circumstances of a bilateral or multilateral agreement. I understand that the lawyers find "possession" a rather difficult concept, and we are talking here about how we are to express in legal language a prohibition on the acquiring of nuclear weapons by those nations which have not already acquired them or manufactured them. But I would ask: can a State be said to possess a nuclear weapon when it cannot be used or moved without the permission of another State, and when it is under guard by soldiers of the other State? It does not seem to me that such a State could be said to possess a nuclear weapon -- but, of course, I am not a lawyer. Under the conditions I have mentioned, the State we are considering would surely not have free disposal of a nuclear weapon.

The Soviet Union representative referred to statements made by representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that it was necessary to give Western Germany the right to raise its voice in connexion with the use of nuclear weapons on German territory (ENDC/PV.260, pp.8,9). This was one of a series of quotations by which the representative of the Soviet Union sought to demonstrate the German intention eventually to become an independent nuclear Power.

But, taken by itself, is there anything unreasonable in the German claim set out in the quotation? Should not any nation on whose territory nuclear weapons are deployed for its defence have the right to a voice in determining how they may be used? This does not and cannot mean the right to give the final catastrophic order that they shall be used, because only a State possessing nuclear weapons -- and I use the term here in the meaning given to it in the Soviet Union draft treaty (ENDC/164) -- can give such an order.

To endeavour to write into a treaty conditions prohibiting consultation, joint debate on and determination of nuclear weapons policy is to attempt to negate the essence of an alliance. Furthermore, such provisions, even if they were drafted and a treaty were signed which contained such provisions, could not be controlled in the sense of being verified. Military plans can be made and staff consultations can take place in secrecy; history shows that these things do happen, whatever international relations appear to be on the surface.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Arguments have also been adduced here to the effect that the treaty should be so drafted as not to allow States not possessing nuclear weapons which are members of an alliance any right in connexion with the disposition or use of nuclear weapons which non-aligned non-nuclear States do not have. I am afraid that this is not a reasonable proposition. Certain States have decided that the best way to find security against apprehended dangers is to become members of an alliance. Other States have decided that their security will best be served if they remain neutral, non-aligned, independent of alliances -- especially of any alliance whose most powerful member is a great nuclear Power.

Both categories of States are represented here. The essential difference between them in relation to the subject which we are considering is that the first group of States has decided it must be in an alliance in which some members possess nuclear weapons, because those nuclear weapons are a deterrent against aggression and serve to counter nuclear weapons possessed by certain members of the opposing alliance. The situation of the non-aligned non-nuclear States is different. They have chosen their status and have looked for their safety by avoiding alliances, avoiding the difficulties and complications of providing themselves with nuclear weapons.

The Canadian delegation believes, therefore, that in determining what is to be included in the eventual treaty in regard to the obligations of States not possessing nuclear weapons, it is not helpful to use as a criterion the notion that States not possessing nuclear weapons which are members of an alliance wherein one member possesses nuclear weapons shall have no more to say in connexion with the use of those weapons than non-aligned States not possessing nuclear weapons.

The representative of Nigeria was good enough to refer to some remarks that I had made in relation to the question of guarantees. I would merely point out at this stage that the first remarks which he quoted were in relation to the idea of an undertaking by States possessing nuclear weapons not to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing them -- and incidentally, this idea was, I think, first raised in the First Committee last year by the Nigerian delegation (A/C.1/PV.1356, pp.27-31; ENDC/PV.235, pp.31, 32). The subsequent remarks which Mr. Ijewere quoted were intended to apply to a different type of guarantee -- that is, where the nuclear Powers would come to the assistance of and protect any non-nuclear weapon State which

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

was threatened. These are two different cases. If the representative of Nigeria will study my statement again or speak to me about it, he will obtain an explanation of the apparent difference which he mentioned.

I shall now turn to a point rising out of our discussions on general and complete disarmament. On 21 April (ENDC/PV.258, p.8) the representative of the Soviet Union quoted the following phrase from a statement which I had made on 17 March:

"... to ensure that, when a change in social and political organization is plainly necessary in any part of the world, it can be effected peacefully without international or civil war." (ENDC/PV.249, p.7).

Mr. Roshchin went on to say that from that portion of my statement which he quoted it would seem that the Canadian delegation casts serious doubt on the possibility of effective work on the problem of general and complete disarmament at the present time (ENDC/PV.258, p.8). If the Soviet Union and other delegations will read again carefully the statement I made on 17 March (ENDC/PV.249), they will see that its whole point was a discussion of how it will be possible to begin work on the problem of general and complete disarmament, how to escape from the impasse in which we have found ourselves on this question for years now, and how to begin some positive move towards the reduction of nuclear and other armaments.

There is no reason to believe that this cannot be done, unless one gives way to despair and concludes that the super-Powers will never move from their present positions. But both sides have shown some movement in the past, and they will be able to do so again if they really desire to make agreements that lead towards or call for actual disarmament. Such agreement could precede or be part of the first stage of the process of general and complete disarmament.

I should also like to comment on the following argument that Mr. Roshchin used in his statement on 21 April:

"Furthermore, the Canadian representative linked the solution of this problem with the need to find some means of solving the internal problems of States 'without civil war'. Such a formulation of the question basically contradicts the laws of the development of human society, contains a denial of the right of peoples to struggle for national liberation and against reactionary regimes ..." (ENDC/PV.258, p.8)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

This would seem to be a restatement of what has been said by authoritative spokesmen of the Soviet Union in the past: that, whilst they are against war between nations, they are in favour of what they describe as "wars of liberation". Of course it would rest within the judgement of the Soviet Union authorities to determine what is a war of liberation. The danger to the concept of peaceful coexistence of insisting on maintaining the virtue of one kind of war has been pointed out many times. The trouble is that, when a civil war or a war of liberation is taking place, there is a strong incentive for the greater Powers to become involved in it, each supporting the side which in its subjective judgement is pursuing the right policies.

In the view of the Canadian delegation, the recent debate in the First Committee of the twentieth session of the General Assembly on the inadmissibility of intervention in the affairs of States brought out, perhaps indirectly, the dangers to international peace which can arise from the existence of civil wars and armed strife within nations. I should like to quote the first and a portion of the second operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), which resulted from the discussion of the subject in the twentieth session of the Assembly:

"No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned.

"... Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State." (A/RES/2131 (XX)/Rev.1)

These two portions of the operative part of the resolution are intended to prevent other States from becoming involved in "internal affairs" -- extending to civil strife -- in another State. If it could be conceived that all the members of the United Nations would always comply with the edict of non-intervention contained in those paragraphs of the resolution, then perhaps my reference to the desirability of changes in social and political organizations in any part of the world being effected peacefully, without civil war, would have no particular relevance.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

However, I should now like to repeat the sentence which followed the portion of my statement which was quoted by the representative of the Soviet Union:

"Only when we have made much more progress in organizing a peaceful world will it be possible to move to the last stage of disarmament and finally" -- I repeat, finally -- "eliminate the terrific weapons which now preserve what is admittedly a perilous and precarious peace." (ENDC/PV.249,p.7)

Once again I emphasize that the statement to which the representative of the Soviet Union took exception should be looked at in the context of the whole of the argument contained in my intervention of 17 March, which was an attempt to answer the question: how do we begin to move in the direction of general and complete disarmament after years of impasse?

That was all that I wished to say today. We hope that our colleagues, and especially the representatives of the great Powers, will devote the recess to reconsidering their positions with the aim of finding some measure upon which we can agree during the next round of discussions. The Canadian delegation intends, of course, to do what it can to make the next session more productive.

The CHAIRMAN (India): I now call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I am deeply sorry that the delegation of Nigeria, from which so much constructive thought on disarmament problems has come in the past, should have brought into our deliberations here this morning the issue of the Rhodesian crisis. I regard as contrived the attempt of the representative of Nigeria to connect the matter with our disarmament discussions here. Of course, there is always a connexion between crisis and strife anywhere in the world and the chances of achieving disarmament agreement; but I think the position in Rhodesia at the moment has only the very remotest connexion with the sort of problems we are trying to solve here. But I am even more depressed at the deplorable interpretation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government with which the representative of Nigeria, having brought up the subject, tried to impress this Committee, and I should like to take him up on three specific points.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

First, it is not true to state, as he did, that no action is being taken against the illegal regime in Rhodesia. The strongest possible economic action is being taken, the most powerful economic sanctions have been applied, and vigorous diplomatic activity is going on constantly in an attempt to solve this agonizing problem.

Secondly, it is not true to say that the reason why Her Majesty's Government did not take military action against the regime was simply that the rebels were well armed. Whatever had been the condition of the rebels' armament, the reason Her Majesty's Government did not take military action was that to do so would have led to a war that might have spread outside the borders of Rhodesia and even outside the borders of Africa. But even if the war had remained there, it would have brought about unimaginable suffering for white people and black people alike in Africa.

Thirdly, it is not true to say that Her Majesty's Government engages in some form of discrimination against the Africans in Rhodesia. The whole of our Rhodesia policy is designed and has been designed since this awful crisis began to one end: that, that the four million Africans in Rhodesia shall have a say, a real say, in the government of their country.

Governments are often attacked in this Conference for using force to solve political problems -- my United States colleague has been subjected to a good deal of this. I find it unusual and bizarre that in this room my Government should come under attack for not using force to solve a political problem. I find it depressing that the representative of Nigeria should use a meeting of a disarmament conference to advocate a policy of military force in the solution of a problem which Her Majesty's Government is determined to solve by peaceful means.

The CHAIRMAN (India): I call on the representative of Nigeria in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): I should like to make a point clear. I think I was misquoted by the representative of the United Kingdom. I did not say that no action had been taken: what I said was that "no appropriate action" had been taken -- and that is quite different.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 262nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador V.C. Trivedi, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Nigeria and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 10 May 1966, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

